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Zwerling: Bias Crimes

LEGISLATING AGAINST HATE IN NEW YORK:
BIAS CRIMES AND THE LESBIAN AND GAY
COMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, crimes of violence, threats, and vandalism, in
which the defendant's conduct was motivated by hatred, prejudice,
or bias based on a victim's actual or perceived race, religion,
national origin, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation, have
increased at an astonishing rate.1 Moreover, the level of violence
of these attacks, evincing bias, is more severe than its non-bias
counterpart. 2 The purpose of this Comment is to explore and
discuss the nature of the bias crimes, with particular attention to
those crimes directed against the lesbian and gay community. The
Comment will examine the statistical data available on bias crimes
against the gay and lesbian community, the need for bias crime
statutes to include sexual orientation as a protected category, and
the constitutionality of hate-crime legislation. Furthermore, it will
compare and contrast two recently proposed bias-crime statutes for
New York State.
Although this Comment centers on bias crimes as they relate to
the lesbian and gay community, nothing in this Comment is
intended to ignore, slight, nor minimize the significance of hate
crimes directed against other categories of victims.
A recent study by the Department of Justice on Bias Crimes
reports that the criminal victimization rate of gays was found to be
400% greater than that of the overall population. 3 Moreover,
1. Hate is Not Speech: A ConstitutionalDefense of Penalty Enhancement
for Hate Crimes, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1314, 1314 (1993) (citing the Hate Crimes
Statistics Act and how the figures recorded, though alarming, understate the
current trend).
2. Brian Levin, Bias Crimes: A Theoretical and Practical Overview 4
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 165, 167 (1992/1993).

3. Id Assaults comprise more than 30% of these attacks.
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during their lifetimes, gays and lesbians often face harassment and
brutality at the hands of relatives, co-workers, and schoolmates, in
addition to stranger-perpetrated attacks. 4 Whereas the victim of a
bias attack, motivated by racial or religious hatred, may retreat to
the comfort and safety of family and friends, the victim of an antigay or lesbian attack is not necessarily able to do the same. This
may be especially true if the victim has not "come out" or revealed
his sexual orientation to family and friends. Any comfort victims
may receive from their family will neither soothe nor help to heal
the true essence of the harm inflicted. 5 Furthermore, of the fortysix states that have currently enacted some type of hate-crime
legislation, 6 only twenty-six states and the District of Columbia
provide for expanded sentences motivated by bias,7 and as of 1990
only about half a dozen cover bias crimes committed because of
8
the victim's sexual orientation.
Additionally, studies show that bias crimes against gays and
lesbians have included some of the most brutal and heinous attacks
ever recorded. 9 Since the particular purpose of these crimes is to
"rub out" the human being because of his or her sexual orientation,
such attacks frequently involve cutting, mutilation, torture, and
beating by groups of strangers, 1 0 in what have been termed
"hunting rituals." 11
4. GREGORY HEREK & KEVIN T. BERRILL, HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING
VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 1 (1992).

5. Tape of Touro Law Center Bias Crime Symposium, Crimes of Hate in
New York State, Terri Maroney, HIV Related Violence Coordinator of the New
York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project (on file with author).
6. Abby Mueller, Can Motive Matter?A Constitutionaland Criminal Law
Analysis of Motive in Hate Crime Legislation, 61 UMKC L. REV. 619, 620

(1993).
7. Don Terry, The Supreme Court: The States and the Law in the
Crackdown on Bias, aNew Tool, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1993, § 1.
8. Rorie Sherman, Hate Crime Statutes Abound: Newest in Vermont
Among Toughest, NAT'L L.J., May 21, 1990, at 3.

9. Id
10. Id (citing Kevin T. Berrill, Anti-Gay Violence and Victimization in the
United States, 5 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 274, 282 (1990)).
11. See Beth Holland, Gay Bashings: 8 Nabbed in Chelsea Spree, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, Sept. 14, 1992, at 5; see also Frederick Lawrence, Resolving the
Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox: Punishing Bias Crimes and Protecting
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Another attribute of bias crime is the grievous psychological and
emotional harm inflicted which goes far beyond the resulting
physical injury or property damage. Such victims experience
nearly two and a half times more negative psychological and
behavioral symptoms than do victims of other types of violence.
This is due to the increased anxiety caused by the unprovoked
nature of the attack and the potential for future similar
12
recurrences.
A victim of crime may feel isolated, angry, and fearful of a
recurrence; but the victim of the bias attack experiences this on a
deeper level, since he or she has been selected from a crowd and
victimized solely because of his or her race, sexual orientation, or
religion. There is nothing the victim in this instance can do. There
is no control over the situation. Nor is there anything the victim
should do to change his or her race, sexual orientation, or religion
in order to prevent such attacks. Thus, such crimes cause more
intense feelings of humiliation, isolation, and self-hatred on the
13
part of the victim.
Additionally, such people are doubly traumatized, once for the
initial attack, and secondly for the feelings of responsibility they
harbor for the "secondary victims"-- those people of the same
group who may feel vicariously assaulted. 14 Since it is the victim's
very existence that makes him a target, and not any particular
activity, the victim is forever fearful and vulnerable. 15 Moreover,
bias crimes directly interfere with the free exercise of one's basic
civil rights, such as the use of public sidewalks, and enjoyment in
16
the security of one's own person.
Racist Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 673, 713 (1993) (stating that the
dynamics of the hate crime combine a mob mentality with primal feelings which
lead to especially horrifying results).
12. Levin, supra note 2, at 167.
13. Joseph M. Fernandez, Bringing Hate Crimes into Focus - The Hate
Crimes StatisticsAct of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-275, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
261,271 (1991).
14. Melinda Henneberger, For Bias Victims, a Double Trauma, NEWSDAY,
January 9, 1992, at 113.

15. Levin, supranote 2, at 167.
16. Levin, supranote 2, at 167.
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Hate crimes are not merely directed at the specific victim. They
also send a clear message to the community to which he or she
belongs. In the case of an anti-gay crime, each attack is a message
of terror intended to silence not only the victim for stepping
outside culturally accepted norms, but to send a warning to all gays
and lesbians to remain "invisible, [in the] self hatred of the
closet." 17 Furthermore, hate crimes are directed toward the
victim's respective group and such acts tend to escalate from
individual conflicts to mass disturbances. This in turn often results
in community disorder, by pitting those who sympathize with the
victim against those who sympathize with the attacker. Ultimately,
society at large becomes the greater victim. 18 "It is an unfortunate
side of human nature.., that each of us is expected to, or forced
to, tolerate some prejudice in our daily lives.... However, [when]
these hateful and intolerant attitudes serve as the basis for criminal
conduct, tolerance must end and criminal sanctions must take
19
over."
I. STATISTICS
For the third consecutive year since 1990, New York City has
led the nation in the number of anti-gay hate crimes ranging from
verbal harassment and beatings, to arson and murder, with an
increase of sixteen percent between 1991 and 1992 in Manhattan
alone. 20
17. HEREK & BERRILL, supra note 4, at 3.
18. See Hate is Not Speech: A Constitutional Defense of Penalty
Enhancement for Hate Crimes, supra note 1,at 1314; see also Abraham
Abramovsky, Bias Crime: A Callfor Alternative Responses, 19 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 875, 875 (1992). One need only look to the recent riots in Crown Heights,
Brooklyn which erupted when a car in a rabbi's procession accidentally jumped
a curb and struck two African-American children, one of whom died. The riots
culminated with the stabbing death of a 29 year old rabbinical student, Yankel
Rosenbaum, in a revenge slaying.
19. E.D. Rosenberg, Hate Crimes, Hate Speech and Free Speech-Florida's
Bias-Intended Crime Statute, 17 NOVA L. REV. 597, 601 (1992).
20. Robert Der, Anti-Gay Crime Rises in '92, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Mar. 12,
1992, at 25 (citing 6th ANNUAL NEW YORK CITY GAY AND LESBIAN ANTIVIOLENCE PROJECT 1992 report on hate crimes against gays and lesbians).
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The New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project has
recorded a nearly four-fold rise in anti-gay and lesbian crimes since
1987, doubling between 1990 to 1992. Moreover, the magnitude of
the violence is increasing. 2 1 The National Gay and Lesbian Task
Force noted a national increase of 172% in attacks on gays and
lesbians in the past five years.2 2 More than half of the survivors of
such crimes in 1990 were physically injured, and nearly seventy
percent of these victims required medical attention. 2 3 Between
1991 and 1992, the number of victims requiring medical attention
24
rose forty-one percent.
A 1984 study by the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force found
that one in every five gay men and one in every ten lesbians
reported being physically assaulted because of their sexual
orientation, and these figures appear to be increasing. 25 This
coincides with several factors, including greater public awareness
and media coverage of gay life, which in and of itself makes gays
and lesbians easier targets. 26 Backlash against the gay and lesbian
community may also be attributable to the unprecedented climate
of anti-gay rhetoric spouted during the national debate over gays in
the military, the introduction of gay awareness into the New York
City school system via the "Children of the Rainbow" curriculum,
vilification by government leaders during the National Republican
Convention, 2 7 and such destructive stereotyping of gays and
lesbians in such films as "Basic Instinct" and "Silence of the
28
Lambs."
21. NEW YORK CITY GAY AND LESBIAN ANTI-VIOLENCE PROJECT, ANNUAL
REPORT 3 (1992) [hereinafter ANTI-VIOLENCE REPORT].

22. Jessey Birnbaum, When Hate Makes a Fist- When Does a Crime
Become a Hate Crime? The Supreme Court Deals With Criminals Who Add
Insult to Injury, TIME MAGAZINE, Apr. 26, 1993, at 30.
23. Matt Foreman, Gay Bashing: A Crime of Hate, N.Y. NEWSDAY, June
23, 1991, at5.
24. Ronald Sullivan, Rise in Gay Bias Crimes Reported, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.
12, 1993, at B6 (citing ANTI-VIOLENCE REPORT).
25. Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientationand the Law, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1519, 1541 (1989).
26. HEREK & BERRILL, supra note 4, at 47.
27. ANTI-VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 3.
28. Sullivan, supranote 24.
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With AIDS came another stigma against those whom the disease
first affected and those perceived to have the virus. The disease
was and is used to rationalize the already existing prejudice and
violence against gays and lesbians. 29 As such, hate-mongers found
a scapegoat on which to vent, as studies confirm with remarks
made during attacks such as "plague carrying faggot" or "try to
spread AIDS now!" 30 Moreover, the visibility of gays and lesbians
in American society, as a result of the AIDS pandemic as well as
the unprecedented media coverage of gay and lesbian issues, has
increased public awareness of gay and lesbians, and may have
exposed them to greater risk of violence. 3 1 Yet, anytime a
persecuted or disempowered group becomes more visible and
moves towards equality, there is a backlash, as our country's
32
history has shown us time and again.
The following is a chart of five cities showing the rates of antigay and lesbian bias crimes for the years 1987-1992. 33 The asterisk
in the chart below represents figures which are unavailable.

29. HEREK & BERRILL, supra note 4, at 2.

30. HEREK & BERRILL, supra note 4, at 39 (noting that 15% of all anti-gay
attacks involved verbal reference to AIDS or were directed at people with
AIDS).
31. HEREK & BERRILL, supranote 4, at 38-39.
32. Arlene Levinson, Threat of Violence: Other Longtime Companion for
Gay Men, Women; Homophobia: Some Call Gay Bashing the Last Permitted
Hate Crime, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 1993, at A8.
33. See Anti-Gay Crimes Are Reported on Rise in 5 Cities, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 1992, at A12; George E. Curry, 2 Convicted in New York Anti-Gay
Slaying, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 21, 1991, at 12 (citing National Gay and Lesbian Task
Force Report); Gary Pierre-Pierre, New Jersey Man Held in Beating of Greewich
Village Couple, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1993, at 31; Sullivan, supra note 24; see
also HEREK & BERRILL, supra note 4, at 37.
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II. UNDER-REPORTING OF ANTI-GAY AND LESBIAN
VIOLENCE
As the steady increase in the number and rate of bias attacks
against the gay and lesbian community increases, the number of
reports of hate crimes to the police has continued its steady fiveyear decline. In 1992, thirty-eight percent of the victims reporting
to the Anti-Violence Project also filed an official report to the
police, compared to forty-one percent in 1991 and forty-eight
percent in 1990. 34 Although reasons for this decline may vary, it is
believed that victims of anti-gay and lesbian crime do not think
that reporting to the police will result in the attacker being caught.
Therefore, the many hours spent drudging through the criminal
process is deemed pointless. Additionally, some are deterred by
fear of retaliation by the perpetrator and publicity concerning the
event. Moreover, many fear secondary victimization by a callous
or insensitive police officer. 35 It is no coincidence that in 1991,
New York police recorded only eighty-eight incidents of anti-gay
34. ANTI-VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 4.
35. ANTI-VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 21.
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crime, about one-seventh of the amount communicated to the AntiViolence Project. 36 However, even if police figures are to be
believed, the number of crimes against gays and lesbians had
increased almost twofold between 1989 and 1990. 3 7 In fact,
despite the decrease in reporting, the police departments in the Gay
and Lesbian Task Force's five city study noted a forty-one percent
increase in 1991 over 1990 in hate crimes against gays and
lesbians. 3 8 Interestingly, this same survey also cited a twenty-nine
percent increase of police abuse directed against gays and
39
lesbians.
According to the New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence
Project, seventy-five percent of those victimized will wind up not
reporting the incident to anyone, which in turn affects the accuracy
of statistics on anti-gay violence. 40 Other national surveys have
determined that anti-gay and lesbian violence may go unreported
sixty-seven to ninety-one percent of the time, 4 1 as compared to
sixty-four percent of crimes committed against the general
population which are not reported to the police. 42 Leading law
firms concur that there is an under-representation of gay and
43
lesbian victimization in bias crime surveys.
There are many and varied reasons for the under-reporting of
anti-gay and lesbian crimes. However, certain reasons do resurface.
36. Dennis Hevesi, Group Finds A 65% Rise in Bias Crime, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 1992, at B4.
37. Evelyn Hernandez, Gay Bashing is Up in City, Report Finds, N.Y.
NEWSDAY, Mar. 7, 1991, at 21.
38. Anti-Gay Crimes Are Reported on Rise in 5 Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
20, 1992, at A12 (citing National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Report).
39. Id.
40. Hevesi, supra note 36 (citing the city's Human Rights Commission's
report on anti-gay violence).
41. GARY D. COMSTOCK, VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 158
(1991).
42. Id. at 159.
43. Leading Law Firm Releases FirstNationalLaw Enforcement Survey for
1992 Revealing Significant Increases in Hate Crimes, P.R.N. ASS'N, Jan. 14,

1993. In this article, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, a national law firm, in
preparing the first 1992 multi-jurisdictional survey as part of an amici brief for
the United States Supreme Court, admits that groups such as gays are not fully
represented due to notable under-reporting. Id
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One survey indicated that sixty-seven percent of the victim's
interviewed, had either experienced or perceived police as being
anti-gay; forty percent said they did not want to risk their sexual
orientation being disclosed to the public; fourteen percent feared
direct abuse by the police; fourteen percent stated that there were
no other witnesses; and nine percent thought it would not be worth
the trouble. 44 On the other hand, of the general population, only
six percent do not report crimes thinking police would not wish to
be bothered, and only three percent thought the police would be
inefficient or insensitive. 45 Thus, police-related explanations for
not coming forward are more common among victims of anti-gay
and lesbian violence (sixty-seven percent and fourteen percent)
6
than for crime victims in general (six percent and three percent).4
Furthermore, whereas the general population bases its choice not to
report on an anticipation of indifference or annoyance on the part
of the police, the lesbian or gay individual makes the decision
47
based on a fear of hostility or abuse by the police.
This fear is widespread and well-founded. 4 8 Although
theoretically police are responsible for safeguarding communities
from such crimes, they often view these incidents as harmless
pranks, or worse, as acceptable conduct. 49 Sometimes the police
themselves are the perpetrators. 50 Law enforcement personnel have
been found to frequently decline to step in, 5 1 to minimize the
44. COMSTOCK, supranote 41, at 159.
45. COMSTOCK, supranote 41, at 159-60.
46. COMSTOCK, supranote 41, at 160.
47. COMSTOCK, supranote 41, at 160.
48. See COMSTOCK, supra note 41, at 21, 294 (citing tables indicating
hostility, abuse, and indifference); see also Developments in the Law: Sexual
Orientationandthe Lav, supra note 25 (citing a history of conflict between law

enforcement and the gay and lesbian community).
49. HEREK & BERRILL, supranote 4, at 31.
50. HEREK & BERRILL, supra note 4, at 31-32 (documenting numerous
deliberate mishandling of anti-gay and lesbian violence cases, verbal and
physical assault, including a 1987 assault on a lesbian couple which left one
woman unconscious, and a 1983 police raid on a gay bar injuring patrons and
destroying the entire interior).
51. See COMSTOCK, supra note 41, at 152; see also Donna Minkowitz, It's
Still Open Season on Gays; Prosecutionof Gay Bashers, 254 THE NATION 11,
368 (1992) (stating that callous Milwaukee police "returned a bleeding 14 year
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gravity of the offense because the victim is gay, to put the blame
on the victim, or to actually verbally and/or physically abuse the
victim. 52 At one point, the International Association of Chiefs of
Police endorsed a "'no hire policy for homosexuals in law
enforcement.' ' 53 From the pre-Stonewall shooting and killing of
two unarmed gay men by a transit officer (whom the grand jury
failed to indict), and routine police violence against gay and
lesbian bars, 54 to other unprovoked violence and harassment by
police in the 1970's and 1980's, 55 and the refusal of a police
sergeant to file a missing person's report once he learned the
missing person was gay, 56 the lingering pattern of anti-gay bias by
police persists.
In 1986, New York County District Attorney Robert Morganthau
stated, in hearings on anti-gay and lesbian violence before the
United States House of Representatives Committee on the
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, that "at times
[lesbians and gay men] have been, and in many areas of the
country, continue to be taunted, harassed and even physically
assaulted by the very people whose job it is to protect them.",57
It is by no means the indifference or intolerance of police
officers alone which may result in the under-reporting of anti-gay
old boy to the clutches of Jeffrey Dahmer because, apparently, they assumed
violence between [what they thought to be] gay lovers was natural").
52. COMSTOCK, supra note 41, at 152.

53. COMSTOCK, supra note 41, at 157 (stating that "'insisting on recruiting
a certain percentage of homosexuals into the field of law enforcement is as
reasonable as insisting on the same representation of diabetics, epileptics, child
molesters, or rapists"').
54. COMSTOCK, supra note 41, at 23.
55. Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientationand the Law, supra note
25, at 1542 n.157 (citing Governor's Task Force on Gay Issues reporting
evidence of abuse and harassment by police as well as a survey of eight cities
which determined that "23% of the gay men and 13% of the lesbians surveyed
reported police abuse due to their sexual orientation").
56. David Kocieniewski, Sis Says Cop 'Robbed My Brother of Dignity',

N.Y. NEWSDAY, Aug. 4, 1991, at 17. The police officer told the sister that her
missing brother was probably "'shacked up with a nice piece of ass."' Id The
woman eventually found her brother, only moments after he died of injuries to
his head as a result of the attack. Id.
57. COMSTOCK, supra note 41, at 153.
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and lesbian crimes. The prejudice within the criminal justice
system itself contributes to the problem as well. Dallas Judge Jack
Hampton justified his lenient sentencing of a man convicted of
murdering two gay men by stating, "[Had the victims] not been out
there trying to spread AIDS around, they'd still be alive
today.... I put prostitutes and gays at about the same level and I'd
58
be hard put to give somebody life for killing a prostitute."
A judge in Broward County, Florida, turned to a prosecuting
attorney during a case where an Asian-American gay male had
been beaten to death and asked jokingly, "' [T]hat's a crime now, to
beat up a homosexual?' The attorney answered, "'[Y]es sir. And
it's also a crime to kill them.' 59 The judge retorted, "'[T]imes
60
have really changed.'
Most recently, Nassau County District Attorney Dennis Dillon,
the prosecutor in the bias murder of Henry Marquez, a gay man
whose car was rammed off the road during a gay bashing incident,
stated in a letter written earlier that year, that a gay person is "'a
deviant, disordered person who contravenes Catholic moral
teaching."' 6 1 It was only after storms of protest from the gay
community that the original charge of manslaughter was upgraded
to murder and the bail amount was raised from $15,000 to
$500,000.62 How can someone harboring such sentiments be
expected to zealously prosecute a bias crime?
Secondary victimization can also occur during the trial when
there is an accusation that the gay victim brought the situation
upon himself, by the tactic of employing the "homosexual panic
defense." This defense alleges that the defendant's actions resulted
from a psychological panic (i.e. latent homosexuality), causing the
58. Jonathan Willmott, Comment, Victim Characteristics and Equal
Protectionfor the Lives of All: An Alternative Analysis of Booth v. Maryland
and South Carolina v. Gathers and a Proposed Standardfor the Admission of
Victim Characteristicsin Sentencing, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1990).

59. HERRICK & BERRILL, supranote 4, at 294.
60. HERRICK & BERRILL, supranote 4, at 294.
61. Shirley E. Perlman, Request in Bias Case, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 19,
1992, at 28.
62. Eric Nagourney, New Charge in Alleged Ga, Bashing,N.Y. NEWSDAY,
Mar. 13, 1992, at 5.
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defendant to act in self-defense from a sexual overture. 63 Not only
does this defense appeal to the stereotype of the sexually predatory
gay person, but it also assumes that murder is an appropriate
answer to an advance by a person of the same sex. 64 This defense
is very successful against prosecutions of many anti-gay violence
cases and is most successful when the victim is dead. 65 Although
this defense has been denied by appellate courts, this strategy
appears to have met with success before juries and sentencing
judges. 66 By example, we need look only again to Nassau County
District Attorney Dennis Dillon, who is under attack for not
securing a grand jury indictment of a defendant accused of
stabbing his victim in the heart and neck, all in the name of self
defense to an unwanted sexual advance. 67 In New York, following
the murder of Jesus Santiago, a transvestite who witnesses claimed
was killed when it was discovered that she was a male, 68 the AntiViolence Project began a phone calling campaign to the Mayor and
leafleting the police headquarters to have this case designated a
bias crime. 69 As a result, "homosexual panic" assaults as well as
murders are now considered bias crimes by the New York City
70
Police Department.
Even at an anti-hate seminar given on behalf of the Elie Weisel
Foundation, where a panelist gave a homophobic speech against a
gay rights leader, no one, not a panelist nor foundation member,
63. HERRICK & BERRILL, supranote 4, at 295.
64. HERRICK & BERRILL, supranote 4, at 295.
65. HERRICK & BERRILL, supra note 4, at 295. See Developments in the

Law: Sexual Onfentation and the Law, supra note 25, at 1545. "[N]o court
recognizing the partial defense of diminished capacity has ever barred evidence

of homosexual panic as a matter of law or because homosexual panic rests on an
unsupported and untenable psychological theory." Id. This defense contravenes
the American Psychiatric Associations' declassifying homosexuality as a mental
illness.
66. Marney Rich Keenen, "Homosexual Panic" Used as Defense in Murder
Trials, GANNETr NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 28, 1993.
67. Maureen Fan, Group Assails Nassau D.A., N.Y. NEWSDAY, Sept. 2,
1993, at 22.
68. ANTI-VIOLENCE REPORT, supranote 21, at 5.
69. ANTI-VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 10.
70. ANTI-VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 10.
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spoke up to protest. 7 1 The gay leader who was the brunt of this
commentary, Matt Foreman of the Anti-Violence Project, removed
72
himself from the conference.
Lesbians and gays, in their lifetime are likely to experience
rejection, stigmatization, alienation, or indifference from family,
friends, and society in general. However, as victims of bias crime
they face further victimization because of society's allowance of
such prejudice and acts of discrimination and violence against
them. Studies have shown that hostility against gays and lesbians is
condoned by large numbers of Americans, more so than bias
against any other group and thus evokes less sympathy for the
victim. 73 These same studies show that the most severe hostilities
by youths are aimed at gays and lesbians. 74 Moreover, as a result
of reporting the crime, the victim's sexual orientation becomes a
matter of public record, which could cost the victim his or her
employment, housing, or child custody. 75 In other jurisdictions, the
victim may risk prosecution under state sodomy statutes which
76
may carry prison sentences of over ten years.
It is due to these foregoing factors (mistrust, fear of exposure,
retaliation) that the Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990 may never
be able to provide accurate statistics of hate crimes in this country.
While virtually all of the country's 16,000 law enforcement
agencies participate in the overall crime reporting system, the level
of compliance with regard to bias crime reporting is
discouraging. 7 7 However, the Act's higher goal of finding a

71. Gabrielle Rotello, Hate Includes Honophobia,N.Y. NEWSDAY, Dec. 2,

1992, at 90.
72. Id

73. Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 881

(citing Daniel Goleman,

Homophobia: Scientists Find Clues to its Roots, NY TIMES, July 10, 1990 at

Cl).
74. Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 881 (citing the Governor's Task Force
on Bias Related Violence Final Report).
75. HEREK & BERRILL, supra note 4, at 289.
76. HEREK & BERRILL, supra note 4, at 290.
77. Levin, supra note 2, at 171. As of 1992 ten states supplied usable
statistics for 1990, fifteen states participated fully, and eleven states and
Washington D.C. partially participated. Thirteen states made a commitment to,
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meaningful,
serious
governmental
response
to,
and
acknowledgment and awareness of, incidents of bias crimes, by the
Act may nonetheless be served. 78 Whether secondary
victimization, by police and the court system is real or not, the
widespread view that it has occurred can only serve to fuel the
under-reporting of anti-gay crimes.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BIAS CRIMINAL AND
THE BIAS CRIME VICTIM
From the data available, some general characteristics of the antigay perpetrator ("gay basher") emerge which may provide an
explanation for fewer prosecutions and reportings of anti-gay
crime. For example, ninety-four percent of all assailants are male,
and nearly half of them are twenty-one years old or younger with
seventy percent being less than twenty-eight years old. 7 9 This
figure is compared to twenty-nine percent of defendants under
twenty-two years of age acting against the general population. 80
Other studies show that since 1981, approximately seventy percent
of those arrested in New York City for bias-related incidents were
under nineteen years of age with forty percent of these defendants
being younger than sixteen years old, 81 as compared to seventeen
and twenty-five years of age being the average age for non-bias
criminals. 82 Furthermore, the vast majority of bias criminals are
not members of organized hate groups and are far less
sophisticated than terrorist organizations such as Skinheads or the
83
Ku Klux Klan.

but have not yet participated and eleven states did not participate at all in crime
reporting. Id.

78.
79.
80.
81.

Fernandez, supra note 13, at 291.
HEREK & BERRILL, supranote 4, at 59.
HEREK & BERRILL, supra note 4, at 91.
Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 886 (citing James McKinley Jr.
Tracking Crimes of Prejudice:A Huntfor the Elusive Truth, N.Y TIMES, June
29, 1990, at A1).

82. Levin, supra note 2, at 169.
83. Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 886.
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Perhaps the most alarming statistic is that perpetrators appear to
be quite ordinary, average young men, often models of middleclass respectability. Few have criminal records or histories of
psychological problems. This background information may also
account for under-reporting and lack of prosecution, since judges
tend to try the assailant as a juvenile, release him into the custody
of his parents, and order only probation in the belief that the
defendant has been "punished enough," which minimizes the
severity of the offense. 84 Despite prosecutorial attempts to charge
the highest possible offense, to avoid plea bargaining, and obtain
harsh sentences, judges are still hesitant to give juveniles harsh
sentences. They opt instead for a "slap on the wrist" in the form of
fines and community service and ultimately release the perpetrator.
The view here is that these youths do not realize the seriousness of
their actions. 85
As for the victims of these crimes, gay men tend to be
outnumbered nearly fifty percent of the time in these attacks and
gay women, thirty-three percent of the time. These percentages
increase as the age of the attacker decreases. 86 Furthermore, male
victims who are alone are nearly twice as likely to be attacked than
when in the company of another person. Conversely, lesbians who
87
are in pairs are more likely to be attacked than those alone.
Statistics also show that forty-three percent of all victims are
between eighteen and twenty-nine years of age, and forty-six
percent are between thirty years and forty-four years of age. While
the statistics show that seventy-two percent of these victims tend to
be Caucasian, sixteen percent Latino, and nine percent AfricanAmerican, it is believed that these figures are inaccurate in the
recording of bias crimes against men of color.88

84. See HEREK & BERRILL, supra note 4, at 91-92; see also Levin, supra
note 2, at 170.
85. Peter Finn, Bias Crimes: Difficult to Define, Difficult to Prosecute New
Laws and Techniques That are Putting Bigots Behind Bars, A.B.A. J. SEC. OF
CRIM. JUST. 19 (1988).
86. HEREK & BERRILL, supranote 4, at 63.
87. HEREK & BERRILL, supranote 4, at 65.

88. ANTi-VIOLENCE REPORT, supranote 21, at 6.
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Additional problems, such as lack of systematic methods of
designating hate crimes as such, defining them, recording them or
adequate reporting procedures, often halt prosecutions. Often such
crimes are not defined as bias incidents unless the evidence is
overwhelming. This is especially true if labeling a crime as biasrelated requires detailed and demanding procedures which differ
from other crimes. 89 For example, it took nine months to classify
the Julio Rivera gay bashing murder as a bias crime, and a full time
detective was never assigned to investigate the case. 90 Yet, in this
case the defendants, who were Skinheads, traveled to a local gay
"cruising area" "hunting" for a "homo." Upon finding Rivera, they
killed him "because he was gay," 9 1 by beating him beyond
recognition with a wrench and claw hammer, and then fatally
92
stabbing him with a knife.

Given the aforementioned statistics, as well as ample
justification as to why these figures grossly underestimate the
current situation, along with the present lack of any laws in New
York specifically calling for tougher sentences in cases of bias
crimes, with the inclusion of gays and lesbians as a protected
group, it is no wonder that crimes against gay people also tend to
be characteristically more violent and heinous than crimes against
non-gay persons. Such is to be expected since there is a greater
93
likelihood that these crimes will go unreported and unpunished.
Despite some agencies and police department's sincere efforts at
improving responses to anti-gay crimes, 94 at the present time,
reporting an anti-gay or lesbian incident is a risk without reward.
89. HEREK & BERRILL, supranote 4, at 133-34.
90. Minkowitz, supra note 51.
91. Joseph Fried, Week in Review, N.Y. TIMES, § 4, at 6.
92. Curtis Taylor, Gay Bash Killing Testimony Witness, N.Y. NEWSDAY,
Nov. 8, 1991, at 6.
93. Miller and Humphreys, Lifestyles and Violence: Homosexual Victims of
Assault and Murder, 3 QUALITATIVE SOC. 169, 179-80 (1980).
94. See HEREK & BERRILL, supra note 4, at 235-37 (citing liaison programs
between the New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project and local
precincts, courtroom monitoring and accompaniment for the victim, and
sensitivity training); see also COMSTOCK, supra note 41, at 160-61 (citing
training sessions regarding lesbian and gay issues and active recruitment of
lesbians and gay men to the police force).
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IV. BIAS CRIME LEGISLATION: CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL LAWS
It is due to the heightened violence, personal degradation, and
the potential for community disaster stemming from bias crimes
that have prompted a response from state legislatures to enact
statutes imposing enhanced penalties, both civil and criminal, for
crimes motivated by prejudice. 95 This Comment will focus on the
latter.
In general, all state bias crimes laws enhance penalties for biasmotivated criminal activity against certain groups of people, or
categories of property. 96 However, many limit this enhancement to
certain crimes such as institutional vandalism or harassment in the
form of interference with religious worship. 97 Some states, like
Vermont, increase sentences for any crime motivated by hatred
98
against any one of the classes mentioned in the statute.
Bias crime statutes come in various forms, such as statutes
specifying increased penalties for bias related crimes 99 or those
creating the crime of "malicious harassment" or "ethnic
intimidation" in which one element is the commission of certain
enumerated underlying offenses. 100 Other statutes similar in nature
to ethnic intimidation laws create new bias crimes that combine an
existing crime and the new element of bias. 10 1 Other states
incorporate bias into their statutes defining aggravated assault.
Moreover, some states merely add the motive of bias to an already
existing list of aggravating factors which a judge may consider in
95. Levin, supra note 2, at 70.
96. Sherman, supra note 8.
97. Sherman, supra note 8.

98. Sherman, supra note 8 (stating that normal one year misdemeanors are
upgraded to two years for a hate crime perpetrator, convicts receiving normally
more than one year but less than five receive a minimum of five years, and
judges must consider any bias motivation of the convict when sentencing
defendants to more than five years).
99. Eric J. Grannis, Fighting Words and Fighting Freestyle: The
Constitutionalityof Penalty Enhancementfor Bias Crimes, 93 COLUM. L. REV.

178 (1993).
100. Id at 181.
101. Id at 182.
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determining a sentence within the statutory range provided by the
102
already existing statute for the underlying crime.
The First Amendment protects speech or beliefs no matter how
vile or loathsome, as long as it remains a belief--even a voiced
belief. However, once such bias goes beyond expression and
thought and "inspires a prejudicial act that injures someone in a
non-communicative manner," society can and should punish the
offender. 103
The issue of whether the First Amendment prohibits states from
enhancing existing penalties if it is found that the defendant
intentionally selected his victim because of the victim's race,
religion, or other specified status was resolved on June 11, 1993,
by the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Wisconsin v.
Mitchell.10 4 In this case, defendant Todd Mitchell, a nineteen year
old black man, was convicted of aggravated battery, for his role in
the severe beating of Gregory Riddick, a fourteen year old white
male who was stomped, punched, and kicked until his attackers
thought he was dead. 105 Normally the maximum sentence for the
crime of aggravated battery in Wisconsin is two years, however
Wisconsin state law provides for penalty enhancement for bias
motivated aggravated battery of up to five years. 106 Mitchell was
found to have acted out of racial bias in the selection of his victim,
as evidenced by his statements of, "Do you feel hyped up to move
on some white people?" and "there goes a white boy; go get
him."' 107 These statements followed a video viewing and
discussion of a scene from the film "Mississippi Burning" wherein
white men beat a black youth while he was praying. 108 As a result
of his actions, Mitchell was sentenced to four years incarceration
based on Wisconsin Statute section 939.645.109
102. Id.
103. David Cole, The Value of Hate Crime Statutes, TEXAS LAW., Mar. 22,
1993, at 18.
104. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
105. State v. Mitchell, 473 N.W.2d 1,2-3 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
106. WIs. STAT. § 939.645 (1989-90).
107. Mitchell, 473 N.W.2d at 2-3.
108. Id.at2.
109. WIs. STAT. § 939.645 (1989-90). The statute provides in pertinent part:
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Mitchell argued that the Wisconsin statute was unconstitutional
in that it punished an offender's bigoted thoughtsll 0 and
discriminatory motive 1 11 because the statute punished criminal
conduct more severely when motivated by bigoted thought than for
some other reason or no reason at all. Furthermore, he argued that
the Wisconsin statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because of
its chilling effect on speech.1 12 The United States Supreme Court
disagreed on all points in a rare unanimous decision, holding that
Mitchell's First Amendment rights were not violated by the
sentencing provision of the Wisconsin statute and reversed the
Wisconsin Supreme Court decision. 1 13
It is important at this juncture to distinguish hate crime statutes
from hate speech statutes. In R.A. V v. City of Saint Paul, 114 the
United States Supreme Court struck down a municipal ordinance
prohibiting the use of only those "fighting words" that insult or
provoke violence on the basis of race, color, religion, or gender.1 15
This speech ordinance applied specifically to expression as it is
conveyed by appellation, symbols, objects, etcetera, where a harm
stems from the communicative impact of these expressions. 116
However, the ordinance prohibited a class of fighting words which
were found to be offensive by the city, and the ordinance therefore,
(1) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying
crime are increased as provided in sub. (2):
(a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948.
(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par. (a)
is committed or selects the property ... that is damaged or

otherwise affected by the crime under par. (a) in whole or in part
because of the actor's belief or perception regarding the race,
religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or
ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of that property,
whether or not the actor's belief or perception was correct.
Id
110. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at2198.
111. Id at2200.
112. Id. at 2201.
113. Id. at 2202.
114. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
115. Id
116. Hate is Not Speech: A ConstitutionalDefense of Penalty Enhancement
for Hate Crimes, supranote 1, at 1317.
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violated the First Amendment rule against content-based
discrimination. 17
Penalty enhancement statutes on the other hand do not punish the
same types of expressions recognized by the First Amendment, but
rather prohibit conduct unprotected by the First Amendment. This
distinction was made clear by the Court in Mitchell. 118 It is absurd
to read the decision in R.A. V. so as to deem a violent beating as a
form of "expressive conduct" to be afforded First Amendment
protection. If such an interpretation is taken, then every crime
could be viewed as an expression of anti-social thoughts or ideas.
In this light, an act of assassination could be seen as an expression
of political dissent. 119 In fact, the courts in New York have
consistently held that no First Amendment issue is raised in the
crime of aggravated harassment, 12 0 since the intent of the statute is
to prohibit violence and physical intimidation based upon
prejudice, and violent acts such as this are not protected under the
First Amendment. 12 1 Though it may be argued that any kind of
conduct conveys an idea or message of some sort and can be
labeled "speech," the Court in Mitchell held that "a physical assault
is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct
122
protected by the First Amendment."

117. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. 2538.
118. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200-01.
119. Hate is Not Speech: A ConstitutionalDefense of Penalty Enhancement
for Hate Crimes, supranote 1,at 1317.
120. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 [3] (McKinney Supp. 1995) provides that:

A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when,
with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, he or
she: ....
3. Strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise subjects another person to physical
contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same because of the race,
color, religion or national origin of such person....
Id.

121. People v. Grupe, 141 Misc. 2d 6, 9, 532 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (Crim. Ct.
N.Y. County 1988).
122. See Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2199; see also Roberts v. United States

Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1988) ("[V]iolence... that produces special harms
distinct from their communicative impact ...are entitled to no constitutional
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Moreover, in the criminal context, the United States Supreme
Court has stated that the Constitution "does not erect a per se
barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one's
beliefs... [at sentencing] merely because those beliefs ...are
1 24
protected by the First Amendment." 12 3 In Barclay v. Florida,
evidence of the defendant's prejudice toward the victim was taken
into account in sentencing the defendant to death, "surely the
severest enhancement of all." 125 Membership in the Black
Liberation Army was deemed relevant to the racial hatred that
inspired the defendant's murder of a white man in order to start a
race riot, despite the First Amendment right to freedom of
association. 126 At the same time, it must be noted that a
defendant's abstract beliefs, however loathsome, cannot be a factor
weighed by ajudge in sentencing a defendant, where it is irrelevant
12 7
to the issues being decided.
Furthermore, any argument that bias crime statutes punish
discriminatory motive must fail as well. Motive as a factor in
sentencing is not a new practice, but has traditionally been merely
one of the factors taken into consideration by judges in
determining what sentence is to be meted out. 12 8 Both good
motives as well as bad motives may be considered at sentencing to
129
determine either lenient or harsher sentences.
Moreover, penalty enhancement statutes advance state interests
unrelated to the suppression of free expression such as protecting
targeted groups from disproportionate victimization, and
interference with their constitutionally protected rights, regardless
protection."); NAACP v. Clariborn Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982)
("The First Amendment does not protect violence.").
123. Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 1097 (1992).
124. 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
125. Id at 942-44, 949.
126. Id
127. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200 (citing Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S.Ct.
1093 (1992)).
128. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2199. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156,
(1987) ("[D]eeply rooted in our legal system is the idea that the more purposeful
the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense and therefore the more
severely it ought to be punished.").
129. Mueller, supra note 6, at 627.
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of the perpetrator's intent. 130 Similar to the discrimination against
someone with regard to accommodations, when people know that
their very being makes them especially prone to being a victim of a
physical assault in a given location, they may well be discouraged
from traveling there. 13 1 People attacked for their religious
practices may refrain from practice, those harmed for their national
origin may retire from political activity, 132 and those who are gay
or lesbian may retreat into a world of darkness and self-hatred by
hiding their true selves from others.
Statutes, such as the one at issue in Wisconsin, penalize what the
attack communicates as well as what it does - it singles out a
person for harm based on his or her sexual orientation, race,
etcetera. The government's interest lies not in repressing or stifling
a homophobic statement but rather in punishing a discriminatory
act that inflicts an identifiable, non-communicative harm.
Moreover, this harm is not an ordinary one. It is not merely an
assault on the victim's person but on his essential human worth,
133
which is an injury that remains long after the scars heal.
Penalty enhancement statutes, like anti-discrimination laws,
prohibit conduct when it is performed "because of' a victim's race,
religion, disability, etcetera. Federal and state anti-discrimination
134
laws have long been upheld against constitutional challenges.
For example, refusing to rent to an African-American is
permissible if it is based on something along the lines of poor
credit history but not if based on the applicant's race. It is not
merely the failure to rent the space to the African-American that is
punished, but the discriminatory motive inherent in the landlord's
refusing to do so because of that person's race. 135 Similarly,
Mitchell's conduct evinced more than just an intent to injure a
130. Grannis, supranote 99, at 219-20.
13 1. Grannis, supranote 99, at 220.
132. Grannis, supra note 99, at 221.
133. David Cole, What's Wrong with Punishing Thought Crimes?, N.J. L.J.,
Mar. 22, 1993, at 17.
134. EnhancedPenaltyfor Choosing Victim Based on Race Does Not Violate
FirstAmendment, N.J. L.J, June 21, 1993, at 80.
135. Court Decisions,Agency Rulings, New Court Decisions, U.S.L.W., Mar.
30, 1993, § 2, at 15.
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person. He did not act regardless of the person's race, but rather
because of it.13 6 It is this purposeful selection coupled with the
already criminal conduct that such statutes aim to punish, not the
perpetrator's thought, speech or motive. Any words used by the
defendant in the commission of that act may be introduced as
circumstantial evidence to prove an intentional selection. 137 The
First Amendment does not preclude the use of speech as evidence
to establish the elements of a crime or to prove intent or motive.
Evidence of a defendant's prior declarations are commonly
admitted in criminal trials, subject to evidentiary rulings
concerning relevancy and reliability. 13 8 Speech is often used to
prove crimes that do not proscribe speech, especially the intent
element of such crimes, where the words themselves are not an
element of the crime. Thus, in criminal law, such bias crime
statutes do not punish the thought but rather create a mens rea
requirement of "purposefulness" with respect to the category of the
39
victim.1
Moreover, "fighting words" and expressive conduct may be
regulated where there is found to be an important governmental
interest and where the regulation is narrowly tailored to effectuate
that interest. In such cases where speech and non-speech elements
are present, the government may restrict the non-speech elements
when it is clear that there is a sufficient compelling interest,
"unrelated to the suppression of belief or expression" which would
justify the indirect burden on the defendant's First Amendment
rights.

14 0

Hate crime statutes are also a valid exercise of a state's
constitutional power to legislate in order to protect the public
136. Kevin Ainsworth, Targeting Conduct: A Constitutional Method of
PenalizingHate Crimes,20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 669, 682 (1993).
137. See Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 616; see also People v. Grupe, 141
Misc. 2d 6, 9, 532 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1988) (stating
that defendant's words are circumstantial evidence that the attack was
committed because of the victim's religion).
138. See Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201; see also Haupt v. United States, 330
U.S. 631 (1947).
139. Grannis, supra note 99, at 179.
140. Mueller, supra note 6, at 624-25 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968)).
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health and safety. Such statutes further the state's important, if not
compelling, interest in eradicating bias crime due to its impact on
the victim, his community, and society in general. 141 Furthermore,
with respect to eliminating the "epidemic of hate violence and
protecting citizens from the violence it precipitates and its tragic
effects," Justice Scalia in R.A. V closed by stating, "[W]e do not
doubt that these interests are compelling." 142 Both federal and
43
state courts concur. 1
One of the purposes of criminal law is to punish the
"blameworthiness entailed in choosing to commit a criminal
wrong," (the mens rea), and the level with which the defendant
acted when performing the proscribed act. 144 Criminal law has
long since held that certain mens rea, culpable criminal mentality,
are more or less blameworthy than others (i.e. intent more culpable
than recklessness). 145 This concept has never been asserted to be
146
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds.
To invalidate penalty enhancement statutes because of a biased
motive would invalidate all anti-discrimination laws. These bias
statutes can be seen merely as the "typical criminal schemes that
differentiate between the levels of severity of criminal conduct
117
based upon the defendant's level of mens rea." l
The handling of the mens rea in bias or penalty enhancement
statutes is in accord with the principles of criminal law because
they make the distinction between knowledge and purpose as it
141. J.D. Selbin, Bashers Beware: The Continuing Constitutionality of Hate
Crimes Statutes After R.A. V, 72 OR. L. REv. 157, 177 (citing U.S. v Gilbert,
813 F.2d 1523, 1531 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 860 (1987)).
142. Id.at 181.
143. Id.See U.S. v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
860 (1987); U.S. v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir.), cert denied,469 U.S. 838
(1984); People v. Grupe, 141 Misc. 2d 6, 9, 532 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (Crim. Ct.
N.Y. County 1988); State v. Beebe, 680 P.2d 11, 13 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
144. S.H. KADISH & S.J. SHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES:

CASES AND MATERIALS 217 (1989).
145. Ainsworth, supra note 136, at 679.
146. Mueller, supra note 6, at 625-26.
147. Dorothy Roberts, What's the Harm in Hate Speech and Bias Attacks?,
N.J. L.J., Apr. 26, 1993. The author is a professor of criminal law and civil
liberties at Rutgers Law School - Newark, New Jersey.
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pertains to the attendant circumstance of the victim's race, religion,
sexual orientation, etcetera. 14 8 The bias-motivated attacker has
acted purposely with regard to this attendant circumstance and is
thus guilty under penalty enhancement statutes. However, the nonbias motivated assailant knows of the victim's sexual orientation
14 9
but is indifferent to this fact.
Specific intent crimes illustrate this "punishment for
blameworthiness" concept wherein an added element of engaging
in certain conduct for a particular purpose, beyond the immediate
act, is part of the underlying crime. For example, New York
defines burglary in the third degree as a criminal trespass with the
intent of committing a felony inside. 15 0 Whether the defendant is
guilty of criminal trespass or burglary depends upon his further
intent once inside, regardless of whether that further plan is carried
out. Punishment rests on the perpetrator's purpose, yet we do not
hold burglary statutes as unconstitutional because they punish this
purpose. If these types of statutes were held to be unconstitutional,
"then all criminal attempt statutes and all of the gradations between
levels of culpability would necessarily fall, as they depend on the
51
actor's motive." 1
Motive, purpose, and intent are all related in that they pertain to
a person's mental processes. However, in the instance of penalty
enhancement or ethnic intimidation laws, it can be illustrated that
these statutes do not punish the motive but rather the purpose of
the criminal conduct. For example, in the burglary scenario, the
purpose of the original break-in is to commit a felony inside. This
is punishable by burglary statutes, regardless of the motivation for
the criminal conduct (i.e. to steal money so as to pay for food). The
nature of the conduct is only altered when the purpose of the initial
break-in is changed, and as a result, the burglary statute may or
may not be applied. For example, if it can be proven that the
purpose of the initial trespass was to obtain the money which the
homeowner had left for the trespasser who was locked out, then the
148. Grannis, supra note 99, at 188.
149. Grannis, supranote 99, at 192.
150. Ainsworth, supra note 136, at 679 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 140.20,
140.10 (McKinney 1988)).
151. Ainsworth, supranote 136, at 680.
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burglary statute would not apply. In this case, the specific intent to
commit a felony was not present even though the same ultimate
15 2
motive was to pay for food.
In the Wisconsin case, the defendant intentionally committed a
battery, but in order to convict him of the hate crime involved, the
further intent of purposefulness, that his victim be a white person,
must be proven. Todd Mitchell was proven to have such "further
intent" since his objective of "moving in on some white people"
could only be achieved by attacking someone of that race. In
essence, Mitchell's purpose was to injure a white person. His
motive could be seen as revenge (i.e. pay-back for what he had
seen in the film). It was to prevent the act of selecting a victim
153
based on that person's race for which the statute was enacted.
Similarly, in New York, the act of harassment in the second
degree is already prohibited by law, 154 but to prove aggravated
harassment1 55 for purposes of a bias crime, a further intent beyond
152. Mueller, supra note 6, at 626-27.
153. See Mueller, supranote 6, at 682; see also Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d

922, 924 (1992) (stating that the act of choosing a victim because of his race or
religion is a type of speech that is subject to regulation).

154. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26 (McKinney Supp. 1995). The section
provides:

A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when, with intent
to harass, annoy or alarm another person:
I. He or she strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects such other person
to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same; or
2. He or she follows a person in or about a public place or places; or
3. He or she engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts
which alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve
no legitimate purpose....

Harassment in the second degree is a violation.
Id.

155. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (3) (McKinney Supp. 1995). Section 240.30
provides that:
A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when,
with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, he or
she:...
3. Strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise subjects another person to physical
contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same because of the race,
color, religion or national origin of such person; ....
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the immediate act must be shown in order to prove that the purpose
of the harassment stemmed from the race, color, religion, or
national origin of the victim. 156 To clarify by means of example, a
racist attacking an African-American in order to steal his money
has not violated a bias crime statute of aggravated harassment,
whereas a racially indifferent perpetrator doing the same act in
order to impress his racistfriends would. 157 It is not the thought
itself, but rather the thought expressed by an act that is already
158
considered a criminal offense that is made punishable.
Moreover, a perpetrator using racial slurs or other derogatory
language in the commission of a violent criminal act does not
necessarily violate penalty enhancement or bias crime statutes,
such epithets unrelated to the confrontation may nonetheless
accompany the underlying attack. 159 The prosecution has the
heavy burden of proving the underlying crime, the dissimilar race,
sexual orientation, or beliefs of the parties, 160 as well as the intent
of the offender to victimize that particular person because of the
16 1
person's actual or perceived membership in a certain group.
The Supreme Court held that the argument that penalty
enhancement statutes will have the effect of chilling speech, by
causing people to refrain from expressing opinions for fear that
such statements will be offered as evidence if a future offense
occurs, is too attenuated and speculative to support a claim that the
law is too broad. 162 This argument could possibly be made with
Aggravated harassment in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
Id.

156. See N.Y. PENAL LAV § 240.26. But see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (3).
157. People v. Miccio, 155 Misc. 2d 697, 589 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Crim. Ct.
Kings County 1992).
158. Id
159. Grannis, supra note 99, at 184.
160. Marc L. Fleischauer, Comment, Teeth Fora PaperTiger: A Proposalto
Add Enforceability to Florida'sHate Crimes Act, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697,
701 (1990).
161. Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 621.
162. See Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201; see also Susan Gellman, Sticks and
Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Words Can Increase Your Sentence?
Constitutionaland Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic IntimidationLavs, 39 U.C.L.A.

L. REV. 333, 358 (1991) ("One of the chief difficulties in drafting an ethnic
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regard to any crime where intent must be proven. 163 Proof is often
found in the accused's own words - i.e. "I hate my boss... I'm
going to kill him one day."' 16 4 It is also crucial to note that a

defendant could be convicted under a penalty enhancement statute
even if he were silent, if other evidence of bias in selecting the
165
victim is available.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court in Mitchell
specifically noted that bias crimes inflict greater harm to
individuals and society, such as emotional harm, retaliatory crimes,
and community unrest. 166 It stated that a state's desire to rectify
67
these harms is a solid basis for hate crime laws. 1
There is evidence that hate crime statutes may in fact deter bias
crimes. 16 8 However, it must be noted that bias crimes are not
solely acts of hate. 169 One study has shown that from the attacker's
point of view, his conduct is a positive act, reinforcing a sense of
pride, superiority, and accomplishment for the benefit of his own
group. 170 As such, the assailant whose mind set is one of fighting
for what he believes in does not believe that he committed a crime
at all, which would obliterate the effect of the hate crime
statute.

17 1

Nonetheless, it can be argued that hate crime statutes also serve a
very simple purpose - that of retribution for a moral wrong. It can
be argued that they represent the societal view that it is especially
morally wrong to assault someone because of his or her status such
intimidation statute is making it broad enough to be effective without reaching
the point of constitutional overbreadth.").
163. Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 618.
164. Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 618.
165. Rosenberg, supranote 19, at 619. See State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558,
563 (Or. 1992) ("Persons can commit that crime without speaking a word, and
holding no opinion other than their perception of the victim's characteristics.").
166. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201.
167. Id.
168. Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note
25, at 1550.
169. John R. Berg, State Legislators Battle Bigotry: Is the Ethnic
IntimidationLaw a ConstitutionallyInfirm and Ineffectual Weapon?, 20 CAP. U.

L. REv. 971, 991 (1991).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 991-92.
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as race, religion, sexual orientation, and that such violent conduct
is intolerable. This can be supported by acknowledging that the
Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he law... is constantly based on
172
notions of morality."
Thus it appears hate crime statutes do not infringe on the right of
an individual to hate people based upon their actual or perceived
sexual orientation, race, religion, or other status. As such, it seems
as though they are a valid response to bigots who are still free to
think as they choose but who cannot express their beliefs and
hatred through criminal conduct. In fact, it should be noted that a
person does not have to hate to be guilty of this crime. 173 No one
is proscribed by penalty enhancement statutes from expressing
homophobia or racism; "the only proscribed method is
violence." 174
V. THE PROBLEMATIC PROSECUTION OF BIASRELATED CRIMES
Despite the upward trend in the number of bias crimes against
the gay and lesbian community, 175 the number of cases being
prosecuted has not risen at the same speed 176 despite the fact that
according to one New York Police Officer, most instances of bias
related violence are seen as prosecution-worthy by law
177
enforcement officials.
Several factors, in addition to under-reporting, explain the lack
of prosecution. The most significant is the problem of proving that
the crime was committed as a result of bias. 178 When individual
officers compile reports, as opposed to police units specializing in
172. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
173. State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558, 563 (Or. 1992).
174. Selbin, supranote 141, at 169.
175. ANTI-VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 21, at 2-3.
176. Tanya K. Hernandez, Note, Bias Crimes: Unconscious Racism in the
Prosecution of "Racially Motivated Violence", 99 YALE L.J. 845, 846 (1990)
(stating that only thirty-three out of eight hundred bias incidents reported in

1988 were prosecuted).
177. Id at 846 n.8 (stating that police officers feel that people disfavored in
the community would not lie about such attacks).
178. Finn, supra note 85, at 23.
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investigating bias crime, cases often lack physical evidence,
verification of use of bias language or witnesses who are
reliable.1 79 This often forces prosecuting attorneys to drop charges
or offer plea bargains, 180 something rarely done in bias crime
1
cases. 18
Additionally, there are obstacles which must be overcome when
determining if a crime was bias-motivated. Prosecutors often use
common sense in this determination. 182 To determine whether an
attack was bias-related, factors considered are the language used in
the course of the attack by the defendant, the seriousness of the
attack, absence of provocation, history of similar attacks in the
vicinity, and the lack of another apparent motive. 183 Once at trial,
the prosecutor must be prepared to deal with the "homosexual
panic" defense and judges who habitually impose lenient sentences
on juvenile offenders, 184 who comprise a large number of
perpetrators of anti-gay violence. 185 Moreover, another problem
hindering the prosecution of bias crimes is the bias of prosecutors
themselves. 186 Since police officers are the criminals in many bias
based incidents, prosecutors may be inclined not to prosecute the
officer. 187 Some prosecutors, as a result of unconscious bias, will
not recognize or worse, see nothing wrong with it. 188
Furthermore, even where a prosecutor strongly desires to pursue
a bias crime case, there is not always ample law on the books to
assist him. There are federal civil rights and criminal statutes

179. Finn, supranote 85, at 23.
180. Finn, supra note 85, at 23.
181. Abraham Abramovsky, Bias Motivated Crime, Part II, N.Y. L.J., Oct.
11, 1989, at 3.
182. Finn, supra note 85, at 23 (providing an example of a cross burning on
a black family's lawn in an all white neighborhood immediately following the
family's arrival to the area).
183. Finn, supranote 85, at 23.
184. Finn, supranote 85, at 47.
185. Levin, supranote 2, at 169.
186. Hernandez, supra note 176, at 852.
187. Hernandez, supra note 176, at 852.
188. Hernandez, supra note 176, at 852.
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available. 189 However, the prosecutor must either demonstrate that
there was a conspiracy against citizen's rights or a conspiracy
motivated by a desire to interfere with a person's civil rights. 190
Though a complete discussion of these statutes is a topic for a
separate article, it should be noted that by their very nature, these
federal statutes are not tailored to address spontaneous violence. It
is thus best left to the state legislatures to supplement the existing
federal statutes with local state laws.
VI. NEW YORK STATE: PRESENT AND PROPOSED
ANTI-BIAS LEGISLATION
Currently, New York utilizes already existing penal as well as
non-penal statutes in response to the increase in bias-related
offenses. 19 1 These statutes include disturbance of religious
193
service, 192 aggravated harassment in the first degree,
189. Hemandez, supra note 176, at 846-47 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 1985
(1982)).
190. Hemandez, supra note 176, at 847.
191. Abramovsky, supranote 18, at 888.
192. N.Y. PENAL LAWv § 240.21 (MeKinney 1989). Section 240.21 states that
"[a] person is guilty of aggravated disorderly conduct, who makes unreasonable
noise or disturbance while at a lawfully assembled religious service or within
one hundred feet thereof, with intent to cause annoyance or alarm or recklessly
creating a risk thereof. Aggravated disorderly conduct is a class A
misdemeanor." Id
193. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.31 (McKinney 1989). This section states:
A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the first degree when with
intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, because of the
race, color, religion or national origin of such person he:
1. Damages premises primarily used for religious purposes, or acquired
pursuant to section six of the religious corporation law and
maintained for purposes of religious instruction, and the damage to
the premises exceeds fifty dollars; or
2. Commits the crime of aggravated harassment in the second degree in
the manner proscribed by the provisions of subdivision three of
section 240.30 of this article and has been previously convicted of
the crime of aggravated harassment in the second degree for the
commission of conduct proscribed by the provisions of subdivision
three of section 240.30 or he has been previously convicted of the
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aggravated harassment in the second degree, 1 94 and sections of the
Religious Corporations Law and Civil Rights Law. 195 This
Comment does not address the latter two.
The aggravated harassment statutes were an attempt to battle
racial and religious hatred by enhancing the penal code's
harassment charge where the intent is bias-related. 196 These
statutes place an emphasis on bias incidents occurring at places of
religious worship by carrying a felony charge for such a crime, but
fail to do likewise for bias-motivated vandalism against a minority
197
person's home, which is frequently the target for hate crimes.
This type of vandalism is only a misdemeanor. 19 8 Although these
statutes do pass constitutional muster, 199 they do not seem to
adequately address the problem of bias crimes.
Under aggravated harassment in the first degree, which is a
felony, 200 destruction of religious property is punished more
harshly than damage to a person under aggravated harassment in
the second degree, which is a misdemeanor. 20 1 For a person to be
crime of aggravated harassment in the first degree within the
preceding ten years.
Aggravated harassment in the first degree is a class E felony.
Id.
194. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (McKinney Supp. 1994). Section 240.30
states:
A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when,
with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, he or
she:...
(3) Strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise subjects another person to
physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same because of
the race, color, religion or national origin of such person....
Aggravated harassment in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor,
Id.
195. Abramovsky, supranote 18, at 889.
196. Abramovsky, supranote 18, at 888-89.
197. Abramovsky, supranote 18, at 889-92.
198. Abramovsky, supranote 18, at 891.
199. Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 893 (citing People v. Dinan, 118 Misc.
2d 857, 461 N.Y.S.2d 724 (City Ct. Nassau County 1983) and People v. Grupe,
141 Misc. 2d 6, 532 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1988)).
200. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.31 (McKinney 1994).
20 1. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (McKinney Supp. 1994).
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convicted under harassment in the first degree for harm to a
person, the defendant must have previously been convicted, within
the past ten years, of aggravated harassment in the second degree
under subdivision three which requires proof of bias. 2 02 In
summation, destroying religious property is a felony on its own,
while hurting a person only becomes a felony with a previous
conviction for bias related aggravated harassment. Statutory reform
must be enacted to place the value of human life above that of
buildings and property.
Furthermore, since sexual orientation is not a protected status
under the current penal law, 203 when a gay man or lesbian is
shoved, kicked, or struck because of his or her sexual orientation,
according to the wording of the statutes, thd most the defendant
would be charged with is harassment in the second degree,
(imposing a maximum of fifteen days in jail or a fine) which is
merely a violation.2 04 Yet, the assailant in a racially motivated
attack faces being charged with a class A misdemeanor, carrying a
sentence of up to one year in jail, for the same bias motivated
5
crime. 20
Without the inclusion of sexual orientation in any current or
proposed bias crime legislation, two standards would emerge. Bias
crimes directed against gays and lesbians would be viewed as less
significant, less pervasive and less reprehensible than similar
crimes motivated by religious, racial, or ethnic hatred. 2 06 This lack
202. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.31 (McKinney 1994).
203. Arthur S. Leonard, Bias Motivated Crime Requires New Lav, N.Y. L.J.,
Sept. 25, 1989, at 2 (stating that although violence against gays and lesbians

may be the biggest category of bias crimes in the U.S. no law in New York
directly addresses this issue).
204. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26 (McKinney Supp. 1995) which provides in
part that:
A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when, with intent
to harass, annoy or alarm another person:
1.He or she strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects such other person
to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same....
Harassment in the second degree is a violation.

Id
205. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (McKinney Supp. 1994).
206. Fernandez, supra note 13, at 274.
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of inclusion, "gives permission to bigoted thugs who feel
responsible to personally rid society of their personal version of
undesirables."207
This same double standard underscored the inclusion of sexual
orientation in the Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990. Sponsors of
the Act took great pains to ensure that "nothing in this Act shall be
construed to promote or encourage homosexuality and that 'the
American family life is the foundation of American society,"' so as
to quell the fears that this Act would open the door to the inclusion
of sexual orientation as a protected status under the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.20 8 Additionally, people with AIDS are not covered
under existing penal law since disability is not included under
aggravated harassment statutes as a protected group. Though they
are counted for investigative and reporting purposes under the
heading of "disability," this only makes the crime a higher priority,
2 09
but there is no increased penalty.
Additionally, the current statutes do not take into consideration
the age of the offenders, when statistics have shown that people
twenty-one or under are the majority of the perpetrators of criminal
activity evincing bias against gays and lesbians. 2 10 Currently,
conventional laws carry only minor penalties for the juvenile biasrelated offender. 2 11 Therefore, it is imperative that any reforms to
the penal code contend with the relative youth of the perpetrators
of hate motivated violence.
Furthermore, the current penalty scheme does not cover acts
motivated by the defendant's prejudice which result in the death of
the victim. The recent death of Yusef Hawkins, 2 12 the not too
207. UNITED PRESS INT'L, Mar. 4, 1992, at regional news.
208. Fernandez, supranote 13, at 279-80, 281.
209. Jonathan Hicks, Bias Crimes Now Include the Disabled, N.Y. TIMEs,

Apr. 21, 1993, at B6 (stating that the inclusion of "disability" is due to the
increasing pressure from gay and lesbian organizations, not as one would have
pre-supposed, from advocates for the disabled).
210. See HEREK & BERRILL, supra note 4, at 29-30.
211. Levin, supra note 2, at 170.

212. Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 877 n.9 (explaining that Hawkins, who
was black was attacked and killed by a gang of white youths because he was in a
predominantly white neighborhood at night).
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distant Howard Beach incident, 2 13 and most recently the death of
Yankel Rosenbaum, 2 14 clearly indicates the need for statutory
reform in this area.
Recently there were two central proposals in the New York State
Legislature to deal with bias crimes: "The Comprehensive Bias and
Gang Assault Act," 2 15 and "The Bias Related Violence and
Intimidation Act." 2 16 Each addresses the ever-mounting concern of
bias related violence in its own unique way and though each has its
strong points and weaknesses, the two together make an effective
weapon to combat bias-motivated violence.
VII. THE COMPREHENSIVE BIAS AND GANG
RELATED ASSAULT ACT
The Comprehensive Gang Act attempts to punish bias and gangrelated violence in tandem by increasing penalties for all assaults
across the board, regardless of motivation. They do this by
expanding criminal mischief in the second degree and creating a
new subdivision to existing assault provisions encompassing
assault in the first, second, and third degree for those situations
2 17
involving three or more assailants.
In order to reflect the severity of the consequences of bias and
gang-related crimes, all assaults are to be elevated one penalty
grade, in addition to amending existing penal law. 2 18 This Act also

213. Abramovsky, supranote 18, at 877.
214. Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 875.
215. See 214th G.A., 2d Reg. Sess., 1993 NY S.B. 1424 (Sponsored by Sen.

R- Marino).
216. See 215th G.A., 1st Reg. Sess., 1993 NY S.B. 1802 (Sponsored by Sen.

M. Ohrenstein).
217. See 214th G.A., 2d Reg. Sess., 1993 NY S.B. 1424.
218. See 214th G.A., 2d Reg. Sess., 1993 NY S.B. 1424 § 3. "The closing
paragraph of section 120.10 of the [P]enal [L]aw is amended to read as follows:
'Assault in the first degree is [to be raised from a class C to] a class B felony."'
Id.; Section 4 of the Senate bill states that:
Section 120.10 of the [P]enal [L]aw is amended by adding a new
subdivision 5 to read as follows:
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expands criminal mischief in the second degree to cover damage to
religious institutions such as churches and synagogues and its
property, schools, cemeteries, community centers, or any personal
property related therein. 2 19 However, this Act does not protect
against bias-motivated vandalism directed against people's homes.
'5. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person and
while aided by two or more other persons actually present, he
causes such injury to such person or to a third person.'

Id.; Section 5 of the Senate bill states: "The closing paragraph of section 120.05
of the [P]enal [L]aw is amended to read as follows: Assault in the second degree
is [to be raised from a class D to] a class C felony." Id.; Section 6 of the Senate
bill states that:
Section 120.05 of the [P]enal [L]aw is amended by adding a new
subdivision 9 to read as follows:
'With intent to cause physical injury to another person and while aided
by two or more other persons actually present, he causes serious physical
injury to such person or to a third person.'
Id.; Section 7 of the Senate bill states: "The closing paragraph of section 120.00
of the [P]enal [L]aw is amended to read as follows: 'Assault in the third degree
is [to be raised from a class A misdemeanor to] a class D felony."' Id.
219. See 214th G.A., 2d Reg. Sess., 1993 NY S.B. 1424 § 8.
Section 145.10 Criminal Mischief in the Second Degree. A person is
guilty of criminal mischief in the second degree when with intent to
damage property of another person, and having no right to do so nor any
reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he:
1. damages property of another person in an amount exceeding one
thousand five hundred dollars; or
2. intentionally or recklessly damages:
(a) a structure used for religious worship;
(b) cemetery or a facility used for memorializing the dead;
(c) a school or community center;
(d) the grounds adjacent to and owned or rented in common with a
structure or facility used for religious worship, as a cemetery,
for memorializing the dead, as a school or community center;
or
(e) personal property used for or in connection with religious
worship, cemetery purposes, memorializing the dead or school
or community center activities, contained in a structure or
located at a facility used for religious worship, as a cemetery,
for memorializing the dead, as a school or community center
in an amount less than one thousand five hundred one dollars.
Criminal Mischief in the second degree is a class D felony.
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The Comprehensive Gang Act does take issue with the group
mentality that is so prevalent in bias-related crimes and responds to
statistics indicating that the majority of bias incidents overall are
committed by groups of four or more. 2 20 However, not all assaults
on gays are gang attacks, 22 1 and though gay men or lesbians tend
to be outnumbered in these incidents, the average ratio is not clear.
Furthermore, the older the assailant, the fewer the number of
attackers per incident. 222 New York City officials have been
calling for gang-related violence measures for years in addition to
bias crime legislation.2 23 Therefore, where attacks are comprised
of two perpetrators, the Comprehensive Gang Act is less than
comprehensive.
To its credit, the Comprehensive Gang Act recognizes the grim
reality of the youthful offender's participation in bias crimes and
does hold fourteen and fifteen year-olds criminally liable for
224
assault in the second degree.
As for sentencing under the Act, the maximum sentence for a
first offender would be twenty-five years for a class B felony,
fifteen years for a class C felony, and seven years for a class D
felony.22 5 Furthermore, the Act mandates that sentences handed
down run consecutively with any other sentences simultaneously
imposed which arise from the same criminal transaction. 22 6 In the
event the court runs the sentences concurrently, it must state on the
227
record with specificity its reasons for doing so.
220. Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 887 (noting that anonymity in numbers
lessens moral responsibility while itadds to the seriousness of the attack).
221. Attorney General Robert Abrams, Not All Bias Crime Bills are Equally
Effective, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1990, at A28.
222. HEREK & BERRILL, supranote 4.
223. M.P. McQueen, Cuomo Urges New Bias Law"- GOP Counters with

Assault Measures, N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 15, 1990, at 2 (noting that Mayor

Dinkins originally introduced the group violence law in response to the Central
Park Jogger attacked by a group ofv"wilding" teenagers).
224. See 214th G.A., 2d Reg. Sess., 1993 NY S.B. 1424 § 10 (amending

subdivision 2 of section 30.00 of the [P]enal [L]aw to hold persons ages thirteen
through fifteen years of age criminally liable "for acts constituting murder in the
second degree...").
225. See 214th G.A., 2d Reg. Sess., 1993 NY S.B. 1424 § 10.
226. See 214th G.A., 2d Reg. Sess., 1993 NY S.B. 1424 § 10.
227. See 214th G.A., 2d Reg. Sess., 1993 NY S.B. 1424 § 13.
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Aggregate maximum sentences under this Act are also enhanced.
In the case of those convicted of class B felonies, the aggregate
maximum is increased from thirty to forty years, 22 8 and if
convicted of two violent felonies (of which one is a class B felony,
such as Assault in the first degree), the maximum aggregate
sentence increases from forty to fifty years. 22 9 Where a defendant
is convicted of three or more violent felonies, the aggregate
230
maximum increases from fifty to sixty years.
This Act also restricts the court's ability to reduce charges from
felony to non-felony offenses where there is reason to believe that
the defendant committed assault in the first or second degree, 23 1
and it also imposes statutory limitations on plea bargain
arrangements. 232
Section 70.25 of the [P]enal [L]aw is amended by adding a new
subdivision 2-E to read as follows:
2-E. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision two of this section or
of article forty of the Criminal Procedure Law when more than one
sentence of imprisonment is imposed on a person convicted of
assault in the first degree ... second degree... or assault in the
third degree.., and an additional offense arising from the same
criminal transaction, the sentence for such assault shall run
consecutive to the other sentence or sentences imposed unless
otherwise prohibited by law.
Provided, however, that the court may, in the interest of justice,
order the sentences to run concurrently in a situation where
consecutive sentences are required by this subdivision if it finds
mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in
which the crime was committed. The defendant and the district
attorney shall have an opportunity to present relevant information to
assist the court in making this determination and the court may, in
its discretion, conduct a hearing with respect to any issue bearing
upon such determination. If the court determines that consecutive
sentences should not be ordered, it shall make a statement on the
record of the facts and circumstances upon which such
determination is based.
Id.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See 214th
See 214th
See 214th
See 214th
See 214th

G.A.,
G.A.,
G.A.,
G.A.,
G.A.,

2d
2d
2d
2d
2d

Reg.
Reg.
Reg.
Reg.
Reg.

Sess.,
Sess.,
Sess.,
Sess.,
Sess.,

1993
1993
1993
1993
1993

NY
NY
NY
NY
NY

S.B.
S.B.
S.B.
S.B.
S.B.

1424
1424
1424
1424
1424

§
§
§
§
§

14(c)(i).
14(c)(ii).
14(c)(iii).
15(b).
16.
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Yet, despite all of these penalty enhancements, one must stop at
this point to question why this Act is called the Comprehensive
Bias and Gang Assault Act.
It is only in the bill's preamble that there is mention of the main
reason for this Act - that being the increase of bias related violence
against enumerated classifications of individuals, including
religion, race, sexual orientation, disability, national origin,
etcetera, and that such acts of hatred are the "antithesis of what this
nation stands for."'2 33 Yet, any consideration of bias in relation to
these penalties or reformed procedures dealing with such attacks
do not come into play until sentencing. 234 It is on this point that
the Comprehensive Gang Act is too vague and clearly does not go
far enough. One might even go so far as to say that this bill suffers
from its own worst enemy -- prejudice.
Since most non-capital systems are infiltrated with bias,
legislators should design sentencing schemes that strictly limit or
eliminate discretionary procedures to reduce discrimination at
Subdivision 4 of section 180.75 of the [C]riminal [P]rocedure Law.. . is
amended to read as follows:
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision[s] two and three of this
section, a local criminal court shall, at the request of the district
attorney, order removal of an action against a juvenile offender to
the family court pursuant to the provisions of article seven hundred
twenty-five of this chapter if, upon consideration of the criteria
specified in subdivision two of section 210.43 of this chapter, it is
determined that to do so would be in the interests of justice. Where,
however, the felony complaint charges the juvenile offender with
murder in the second degree ... rape in the first degree.., sodomy

in the first degree.., assault in the first degree.., assault in the
second degree.., or an armed felony... a determination that such
action be removed to the family court shall, in addition, be based
upon a finding of one or more of the following factors:
(i) mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in
which the crime was committed; or
(ii) where the defendant was not the sole participant in the crime,
the defendant's participation was relatively minor although
not so minor as to constitute a defense to the prosecution; or
(iii) possible deficiencies in proof of the crime.
Id.

233. See 214th G.A., 2d Reg. Sess., 1993 NY S.B. 1424 § 1.
234. See 214th G.A., 2d Reg. Sess., 1993 NY S.B. 1424 § 13.
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sentencing. Thus, all special crimes such as bias-related violence,
would receive equal treatment. 2 35 Short of this, all factors to be
considered by the sentencing judge must be specifically included in
the sentencing provision itself.
The judge at the time of sentencing has the discretion to order
sentences to run consecutively or concurrently based upon
consideration of the circumstances attending the commission of the
crime, including whether or not the offense was committed because
of the victim's actual or perceived membership in an "identifiable
class or group of individuals" as well as the defendant's criminal
record, social history and "any other matter... deem[ed]
relevant .... "236 Without specification within the statutory
language of the sentencing provision itself, the "identifiable class"
could apply to any group of individuals --bankers, teachers, or
lawyers. Vagueness leads one to wonder if the "homosexual panic"
defense could be one of the "other matters deemed relevant." As
previously noted, judges are not necessarily capable of keeping
personal prejudices from influencing them at sentencing. 237 By not
including these categories within the sentencing procedures for
bias crimes, sexual orientation (although mentioned in the
findings) would not necessarily permit a higher maximum sentence
than ordinarily imposed.
Senator Ralph Marino, sponsor of the Comprehensive Gang Act,
has stated that the appropriate time to take factors such as bias into
consideration is at sentencing, and not during the prosecution's
case of proving that the underlying crime was bias motivated. Yet,
while claiming that those categories of victims outlined in the
findings are the reasons for this enhancement, 23 8 they are not
specifically provided for within the bill he sponsors. The criminal
law already distinguishes acts of vandalism against a private
residence and those against a house of worship within the elements
235. Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV.
L. REv. 1626, 1627 (1988).
236. See 214th G.A., 2d Reg. Sess., 1993 NY S.B. 1424 § 23.
237. See Don Terry, The Supreme Court: The States and the Law: In
Crackdown on Bias, A New Tool, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1993, at 8.
238. Q & A: Ralph J. Marino; Where Republicans Stand on Hate Crime
Legislation,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1992, at 7.
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of a crime. 239 Why, therefore, should the penalty enhancements be
any different with respect to harms to individual people based on
sexual orientation, religion, or race, etcetera?
Furthermore, this proposal lists attendant circumstances that the
judge may take into consideration, even though this is something
judges already have implicit authority to do. 240 Yet, the drafters of
this proposal have chosen to place the specific classifications of
victims, named in the legislative findings, outside the scope of the
sentencing provision's factors that a judge is to consider. It is
suspected that one reason for the exclusion stems from Republican
24 1
fears of opening the floodgate to other gay rights legislation.
This fear of teetering on a slippery slope is unfounded. If a person
commits himself or herself to securing for gays and lesbians the
first civil right of every American, they do not and need not be
2 42
committed to every civil right for gay men and lesbians.
Senator Marino insists that to obtain the objective of fighting
bias crime, the best approach is to do so without dealing with the
burden of proving motivation because "all victims are the
same." 243 This is patently untrue since research has shown the
disparate victimization rate of gays and lesbians 244 and the
2 45
differences in the types of physical injuries suffered.
239. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.31 (providing that an aggravated
harassment in the first degree involving a house of worship where damage
exceeds fifty dollars carries a penalty of an E felony); with N.Y. PENAL LAW

§ 145.05 (providing that criminal mischief in the third degree against a person's
property must meet a minimum of two hundred fifty dollars in damage).
240. Matt Foreman, Albany Republicans Show Bias on Bias Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1992, at 22. Matt Foreman is the Executive Director of the New
York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project.
241. See Terry, supra note 237; see also Q &A: Ralph J. Marino,supra note

238. Senate Republican Guy Velella of the Bronx told newspapers, "it opens a
Pandora's box. Our concern is opening up a whole area of gay rights in
teaching. Teachers would have rights to be homosexuals and advocate that is an
acceptable way of life." Id.
242. David Chang, Beyond Uncompromising Positions: Hate Crime
Legislation and the Common Ground Between Conservative Republicans and
Gay Rights Activists, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1098-99 (1994).
243. Q &A: Ralph J. Marino, supranote 238.
244. Levin, supranote 2.
245. Sherman, supranote 8.
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In 1989, Senate Majority Leader Warren Anderson
acknowledged that the general consensus among Republican
Senators was that this bill would "set a precedent by creating a
special protection in the criminal law for homosexuals .... They
questioned whether that should be done."'24 6 Furthermore,
Anderson went so far as to invent his own bill that would
deliberately exclude lesbians and gay men without having to
acknowledge his motives for doing so.247 Failing this, Republicans
lobbied proponents of the bill to remove sexual orientation. 24 8 The
Republican senators, in essence, are sending the message that "it is
less important to protect gays and lesbians subjected to acts of
violence rooted in bigotry, than it is to pander to bigotry itself."'249
The most sweeping reform in the Comprehensive Bias and Gang
Assault Act comes in the form of statutorily mandated systematic
recording of bias-crimes, calling for police to collect figures and
make reports and district attorneys to report the disposition of all
bias crime cases to the Commissioner of Criminal Justice. This in
turn is to be compiled into a quarterly report to be forwarded to the
Governor.2 50 It is only through such standardized data collection
pertaining to the number, type, nature, and frequency of such
crimes that accurate statistics may be obtained. Then, perhaps
educational programs can be designed to prevent such acts of
hatred before they begin.
VIII. THE BIAS RELATED VIOLENCE AND
INTIMIDATION ACT
The Bias Related Act is one of the many Democrat-sponsored
approaches to the increase in acts of violence and intimidation
based on bias, prejudice, and hatred which deprive citizens of their
civil rights because of their race, religion, sexual orientation,
etcetera and disrupt public order. This Act was proposed due to the
246. Sherman, supra note 8.
247. Sherman, supra note 8.
248. Olivier Sultan, The Bias That Won't Speak its Name, N.Y. NEWSDAY,
June 19, 1989 at 46.

249. Id. (quoting author Olivier Stone).
250. See 214th G.A., 2d Reg. Sess., 1993 NY S.B. 1424 § 26.
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lack of existing penal laws specifically addressing bias-motivated
attacks, the recognition of the unique and serious nature of the
harms inflicted, as ,vell as the necessity to prevent their
251
recurrence.
To begin, the Bias Related Act expands the crimes of aggravated
harassment in the second degree 252 and aggravated harassment in
the first degree 2 5 3 to include protections for such attacks
perpetrated because of the victim's sexual orientation, disability,
age or sex, in addition to the existing categories. This, in turn, ends
the disparity in sentences, under the existing penal code provisions,
251. See 215th G.A., Ist Reg. Sess., 1993-91 NY S.B. 1802 § 6.
252. See 215th G.A., 1st Reg. Sess., 1993-94 NY S.B. 1802 § 4. This section
"is amended to read as follows":
Section 240.30 Aggravated harassment in the second degree.
A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when,
with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, he or
she...:
3. Strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise subjects another person to physical
contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same because of the race,
color, religion, sex, disability, age, sexual orientation, or national
origin of such person....
Aggravated harassment in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
Id

253. See 215th G.A., 1st Reg. Sess., 1993-94 NY S.B. 1802 § 5. This section
amends Penal Law section 240.31, aggravated harassment in the first degree, to
read:
A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the first degree when with
intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, because of the
race, color, religion, sex, disability, age, sexual orientation, or national
origin of such person he:...
2. Commits the crime of aggravated harassment in the second degree in
the manner proscribed by the provisions of subdivision three of
section 240.30 of this article and has been previously convicted of
the crime of aggravated harassment in the second degree for the
commission of conduct proscribed by the provisions of subdivision
three of section 240.30 or he has been previously convicted of the
crime of aggravated harassment in the first degree within the
preceding ten years.
Aggravated harassment in the first degree is a class E felony.
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between sentences imposed on defendants attacking a person
because of his race, a class A misdemeanor, and the similar attack
upon a woman because of her sexual orientation, which is a
violation.
More significantly, however, this proposal adds article 490 to the
existing penal law which creates the two additional felonies of bias
related violence or intimidation in the second degree 254 and bias
related violence or intimidation in the first degree. 2 55 In short, Bias
related violence in the second degree requires that the perpetrator
intend to deprive a person of a protected category of a civil right
delineated in the proposal, 2 56 such as enjoying the security of
one's own person, and then intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
causing that person physical injury. First degree bias related
violence requires the same intent as second degree. However, the
254. See 215th G.A., 1st Reg. Sess., 1993-94 NY S.B. 1802 § 6. "Part 4 of
the penal law is amended by adding a new title Y ... ." Section 490.05, bias
related crime or intimidation in the second degree is to read as follows:
A person is guilty of bias related violence or intimidation in the second
degree when, with the intent to deprive an individual or group of
individuals of the exercise of civil rights because of the individual's or
individuals' race, creed, color, national origin, sex, disability, age, or
sexual orientation, such person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
causes damage to the property of another, engages in sexual intercourse
or deviate sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion in violation of
article one hundred thirty of this chapter, or causes physical injury to
another individual. Bias related violence or intimidation in the second
degree is a class D felony.
Id.
255. See 215th G.A., 1st Reg. Sess., 1993-94 NY S.B. 1802 § 6. Bias related
violence or intimidation in the first degree is to read as follows:
A person is guilty of bias related violence or intimidation in the first
degree when, with intent to deprive an individual or group of individuals
of the exercise of civil rights because of the individual's or individuals'
race, creed, color, national origin, sex, disability, age, or sexual
orientation, such person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes the
death of another individual. Bias related violence or intimidation in the
first degree is a class C felony.
Id.
256. See 215th G.A., 1st Reg. Sess., 1993-94 NY S.B. 1802 § 6(6). Also
among the civil rights listed are attending any school or college, use of public
conveyances, public streets, alleys, avenues, sidewalks, parks and public places,
and housing. Id.
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offender must intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause the
death of that person. Thus, acts of "queer baiting" or "gay bashing"
which result in the death of the victim would now be covered.
In essence, this Act is a codification of the "specific intent" mens
rea, in that the defendant must have a further "particular purpose"
of depriving the victim of a protected civil right, such as the right
to walk along the street secure in his or her own person. 257 The
Bias Related Act specifically does not prosecute any defendant
whose victim happens to be a member of an identified group
within the provisions or where the victim and defendant are, for
example, of different races, sexual orientations or other groups. In
such cases, existing penal provisions are adequate and are to be
25 8
enforced.
Under the Bias Related Act, it is not a defense that the defendant
acted under a "mistaken belief of fact as to the race, creed, color,
national origin, sex, disability, age, or sexual orientation of an
individual or group of individuals. ' 259 According to law
enforcement personnel, numerous cases of anti-gay and lesbian
violence are visited upon heterosexual victims who are mistakenly
identified as gay260 and under this bill, the criminal act would
nonetheless be covered.
Furthermore, the Bias Related Act defines disability to include a
"physical... or... medical impairment resulting from anatomical,
physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the
exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by
medically
accepted
clinical
or
laboratory
diagnostic
techniques. ' 2 6 1 Thus, the AIDS survivor who is attacked because
of his status is also covered. However, it is conceivable that age,
sex, and disability categories might not belong under a bias crime
bill, since crimes against these groups as a whole may not be
primarily motivated by bias or prejudice, but rather because of the
criminal's opinion that such individuals are easier targets. In the
257.
258.
259.
260.

Abramovsky, supra note 18, at 901.
See 215th G.A., 1st Reg. Sess., 1993-94 NY S.B. 1802 § 6.
See 215th G.A., 1st Reg. Sess., 1993-94 NY S.B. 1802 § 6.
Symposium, G.O.A.L. - Gay Officer's Action League, Officer Tom K.,

Nov. 3, 1993, Touro Law Center.
261. See 215th G.A., 1st Reg. Sess., 1993-94 NY S.B. 1802 § 6.
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case of the HIV-negative gay man, assaulted while his attacker
shouts, "Die, plague carrier!," is it that the victim is perceived to
have the AIDS virus or is it his homosexuality that sparks the
incident? The references to AIDS may merely be a justification in
the defendant's mind for pre-existing homophobia. Then again,
should it matter?
Similar to the Comprehensive Gang Act, the Bias Related Act
also contains statutory requirements for the collection of data and
reporting of incidents of bias crimes. 2 62 It also goes one step
further by providing penalties for failure to comply with this
mandate, or aiding or inciting a violation of this provision, which
include giving $500 to $1000 to the aggrieved party as well as an
A misdemeanor. 2 63 This demonstrates a "no-nonsense" approach
towards looking for a solution to the problem of bias crimes.
Accurate statistics would be obtained or those responsible for
gathering such information would suffer the consequences. As in
the Comprehensive Act, there is mandated consecutive sentencing
where more than one sentence of imprisonment imposed upon a
defendant convicted of bias related violence or intimidation arises
from the same criminal transaction. Such is similar to a defendant
convicted under a class B felony in the Comprehensive Gang Act.
Again, if the judge determines that the sentences are to run
concurrently, he or she must make a statement on the record
specifying the factors comprising that determination. 264 The
critical difference between the two proposals is that under the Bias
Related Violence Act, the judge's discretion enters into play only
after a defendant's conviction, after he has been proven guilty of a
bias crime. Any prejudice a judge may hold regarding the victim's
class will become irrelevant, because a judge's decision not to run
sentences consecutively would be that much harder for her to
justify after the predicate offense under the sentencing provision
has been proven.
This Act, however, has come under much criticism on two
particular points of concern. First, it is argued that the Bias Related
262. See 215th G.A., Ist Reg. Sess., 1993-94 NY S.B. 1802 § 6.
263. See 215th G.A., Ist Reg. Sess., 1993-94 NY S.B. 1802 § 7.
264. See 215th G.A., Ist Reg. Sess., 1993-94 NY S.B. 1802 § 3.
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Violence Act, makes some victims of violent crime more equal
than others by delineating certain groups as being afforded special
rights.265 This is a common misunderstanding of hate crime
statutes such as the Bias Related Act. Anyone can become a victim
of a hate crime: a Christian, an African-American, or in the case of
Wisconsin v. Mitchell,2 66 a white American male. Even a
heterosexual, for example, can be the victim since sexual
orientation as defined under the Bias Related Act includes
heterosexuality. 2 67 These are laws for special crimes not special
groups.26 8 This should dispel the notion that bias crime statutes are
attempting to codify political correctness or provide special rights.
Secondly, and more importantly, is the criticism that the Bias
Related Violence and Intimidation Act contains a "double criminal
intent requirement" in that the District Attorney must not only
prove that the defendant had the requisite intent to commit the
underlying offense complained of, but must further prove that the
defendant did so because of the victim's actual or perceived status,
all beyond a reasonable doubt.
In determining the particular intent to commit the underlying
deprivation because of the victim's status, the prosecution
generally looks to common sense, language used by the attacker
("There is a faggot... go get him!"), the location (just off
Christopher Street, Greenivich Village), lack of provocation, and
the absence of any other motive. 269 However, the prosecution is
not always this fortunate to find such obvious factors. When the
incident occurs on Northern Boulevard, in Bayside, Queens, New
York at three o'clock in the afternoon to a lone victim, this specific
intent may be present, but not as easily proven. In the Julio Rivera
case, police were unaware that the locale of the murder was home

265. Stephan V. Beyer, Hate Crimes Can Affect Any of Us, CHI. TRIB., July
4, 1992, at 2.
266. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
267. See 215th G.A., Ist Reg. Sess., 1993-94 NY S.B. 1802 § 6. "The term
'sexual orientation' shall mean a person['s] ... actual or perceived

homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality." Id.
268. Beyer, supra note 265; see also Terry, supra note 237.
269. Abramovsky, supranote 18, at 90 1.
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to several gay bars and a popular "cruising" area known to gay
men until gay and lesbian groups brought it to their attention. 270
Senator Marino insists that this bill undermines convictions and
puts the prosecution through an unwieldy burden of proving what
is in the mind of a defendant. Yet, proving a defendant's criminal
intent is standard practice for the prosecuting attorney and not an
extra burden. Moreover, the New York State's District Attorneys'
Association, "clearly in a better position to evaluate prosecutorial
1
burdens," favors the idea of the Bias Related Act.27
As the Comprehensive Gang Act and the Bias Related Act
complement each other, it would appear that a truly expansive
approach to the rise in bias crime could be implemented by
combining the best of both proposals.
A combined proposal would provide for statutory reporting of
bias crime statistics, including penalties for non-compliance, as
well as the mandatory consecutive sentencing as seen under the
Bias Related Act. The inclusion of sex, disability, age, and sexual
orientation to the provisions of aggravated harassment in the first
and second degree would be adopted as would the provision
barring the "Mistake of Fact" defense. The Act would incorporate
the additional felonies of bias related violence or intimidation in
the first and second degree to provide prosecutors with an effective
tool to utilize where cases are strong enough to prove the bias
intent, but would also include the increased assault penalties across
the board as seen under the Comprehensive Gang Act. The number
of perpetrators, however, would be lowered to reflect a person
acting with "one or more others" so as to encompass more
cowardly attacks where the victim is outnumbered. This Act would
account for the relative youth of the perpetrators as seen in the
Comprehensive Gang Act. A large number of hate-motivated
criminals tend to be young middle-class white males who believe
that their acts of assault serve the community morality, or even
some higher morality; they are "vigilantes in pursuit of justice as
270. Tape of Touro Law Center Bias Crime Symposium, Crimes of Hate in
New York State, Terri Maroney, HIV Related Violence Coordinator of the New
York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project (on file with author).
271. Foreman, supra note 240.
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they see it."' 272 As such, social scientists believe that these young
people may be particularly receptive to signals from higher
authority since they are "essentially conformist and superficially
rebellious." 2 73 If one does not see this act of hate as warranting
criminal punishment, or fails to comprehend that his act is indeed
criminal, then increased penalties for all assaults does nothing to
address this vigilantism.2 74 It is the duty of society to unscramble
2 75
any confusion one may have between right and wrong.
Added to this Act would be a statutory scheme under which
prosecutors would be monitored and required to notify the
complaining witness when decisions are made not to prosecute
under the Bias Related Violence and Intimidation Act criminal
provisions and the reasons for this decision. This would force the
hand of the biased or unconsciously racist prosecutor and
encourage all prosecutors to fully investigate bias complaints. Only
with such a provision would the victim of a bias crime feel
confident that his claim is taken seriously. This would encourage
more victims to come forward, which in turn, would lead to more
accurate statistics and reporting.
CONCLUSION

Hate crime is a special offense with a particular harm. There is
no clear answer to the current problem of hate and prejudice that
cuts through our society. However, traditional laws and inaction in
the face of the rising tide of bias crime can be seen as nothing less
than acquiescence of elected officials by those they purportedly
represent.
Penalty enhancement statutes proposed for New York
specifically target this criminal conduct. Moreover, the Bias
Related Act cannot be deemed a "thought crime" as it addresses
the perpetrator's intent of selecting to deprive his victim of a
protected right because of the race, religion, sexual orientation, or
other status of that victim. As such, these two bills, either alone or
272.
273.
274.
275.

Chang, supra note 242, at 1100.
Chang, supra note 242, at I101.
Chang, supra note 242, at 1102.
Chang, supra note 242.
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in tandem, advance New York State's interests which are unrelated
to the suppression of freedom of expression without cutting into
First Amendment rights any more than is absolutely necessary to
protect these compelling interests. They are constitutionally sound.
Although bias crimes may never be eliminated altogether by any
one act, passing of such legislation, in conjunction with the work
of bias reporting agencies, community liaisons, educational
programs, and special training of law enforcement personnel, in
recognizing and handling bias cases, would provide the vitally
necessary ammunition to protect both individuals and communities
from violent bigoted attacks.
Despite recent strides made by the gay and lesbian community,
society still denies them basic human rights strictly because of
their sexual orientation. It cannot be debated that everyone has the
right to be secure in their own person and to be free from violent
assaults. As the reportedly largest and fastest growing group of
victims of bias crimes in the nation, gays and lesbians must be
included in any proposed hate crime legislation and not settle for
token measures, lest the message be sent out more than twenty-five
years after the Stonewall Rebellion, that gay-bashing is the last
permitted hate crime.
Martin S. Zwerling
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